These days marks the fifth anniversary of the resumption of hostilities in eastern Ukraine after the first Minsk agreements were signed.
By Rudolf Guljaew
The shelling of a bus at Volnovakha on January 19, a bus station in the center of Donetsk on January 22 and the Ordzhonikidzevskyi Rayon in the east of Mariupol on January 24 were the tragic highlights.
Events of January 24, 2015
The Ordzhonikidzevskyi Rayon around wulitsa Olimpiiskaya on the eastern edge of the city of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov in the far south-east of Ukraine was bombarded by rocket launchers on Saturday, January 24, 2015 at 9:15 a.m. The shelling killed 30 people and injured another 107. At least 16 buildings were partially badly damaged or burned down.
An hour later, a patrol from the OSCE SMM Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was on site and began to document the consequences of the fire. On the same day she published a so-called "Spot Report", which is still an important source of information. In the following days, the SMM returned to the scene several times. On January 26, the SMM reported in its Daily Report the results of its investigations [ii].
"At approximately 9:15 a.m. on January 24, the SMM in government-controlled Mariupol heard at its location incoming massed Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) attacks from a north-east direction, consisting of an extremely heavy barrage lasting 35 seconds. Twenty minutes later the SMM received information from the Joint Center for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in Mariupol and other sources, that shelling had occurred in the area of Olimpiiska Street, in Ordzhonikidzevskyi district, 8.5 km north-east of Mariupol city center, approximately 400 meters from a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint.
At 10: 20hrs the SMM went to Olimpiiska Street and saw seven adult civilians dead. The SMM observed in an area of 1.6 km by 1.1 km, including an open market, multiple impacts on buildings, retail shops, homes and a school. The SMM observed cars on fire and windows facing the north-eastern side of a nine-storey building shattered. The SMM was able to count 19 rocket strikes and is certain there are more "[iii]
As expected, the conflict parties, i.e. the Ukrainian government, and the political leadership of the Donetsk People's Republic mutually responsible for this tragedy. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch also launched an investigation to find its way through the flood of conflicting information. On social media, more or less expert users speculated about circumstances and responsibility.
Still relevant today
The question is still relevant today because shelling at residential areas is still common practice in the conflict in eastern Ukraine and could become a stumbling block in the peace process. The Ukrainian government troops are responsible for the majority of such cases [iv].
Bellingcat indicted
In May 2018, more than three years after the tragic events in Mariupol, the internet investigation team Bellingcat claimed that it identified those responsible in the person of several armed forces fighters of the Donetsk People's Republic and several Russian army officers [v]. Bellingcat was of the opinion that the shelling came from so-called "Russian-controlled" territory and that this shelling was prepared, monitored and carried out by active Russian officers. Bellingcat claims to have identified nine Russian officers who were directly involved in the operation. For this purpose, two rocket launcher batteries had been transported from Russia to the Mariupol region on the previous evening. In the early hours of the morning, they went into position and, after the operation had been carried out, crossed the state border again in the direction of Russia. The order to fire the Ordzhonikidzevskyi Rayon came from the command of the armed formations of the DNR from Donetsk.
Origin of the information
In his investigation, Bellingcat relies essentially on wiretapped telephone conversations between the officers involved, as well as on analysis of image material.
The talks on which the Bellingcat investigation is based were made available to a small team of investigative journalists by the Ukrainian government. Since these are conversations via mobile phones, the Ukrainian law enforcement authorities and the domestic intelligence agency SBU are most likely to be the originators. Starting from the assumption that the military intelligence service concentrates on military telecommunications equipment, one can be even more precise: The recordings of the telephone calls come from the Ukrainian domestic secret service SBU. He is notoriously known for his violations of human rights and has been repeatedly criticized in the past by the UN Human Rights Commissioner [vi].
The two most common means of listening to mobile phones are SIM card cloning and the use of an IMSI catcher. The former requires physical access to a user's SIM card. An IMSI catcher imitates the function of a conventional base station for mobile telephony, so that calls in a certain area run via the IMSI catcher of the secret service and no longer via the infrastructure of the commercial provider. The service then has the content of the call, including the so-called metadata, which contains information about the telephone device, the SIM card, the duration and location of the call and other things. Bellingcat received audio files and meta files separately. That should have made Bellingcat suspicious. The comparison with the data of the telecommunications provider, over whose infrastructure the discussions were conducted, is a weak form of verification, because it would be easy to produce audio files that correspond to the information provided by the commercial provider. It would also be interesting to know from whom Bellingcat received the information from the telecommunications providers. Such providers are not allowed to give their data to unauthorized persons, which suggests that they also come from the Ukrainian government. In other words, Bellingcat checked the reliability of a source using information from the same source.
It is surprising that the Ukrainian authorities did not deliver the results of their artillery reconnaissance on the telephone conversations they heard. The accuracy of the Soviet proven sound measuring devices, which the Ukrainian government troops (UAF) have, is sufficient for the purposes of Bellingcat.
The use of mobile phones in this context is unusual. If regular Russian artillery units were in use, they would have brought their radios and other telecommunications equipment with them, as these are standard equipment for artillery units. In the Kuznetsi - Bezimmene - Oktiabr area, where the batteries took their positions according to Bellingcat on the morning of January 24, 2015, communication using conventional VHF walkie-talkies would have been possible, because terrain and distances allow it [vii]. There is a road southeast of the village of Kuznetsi that crosses the state border between Russia and Ukraine [viii]. This is not uncommon in an area in which the course of the border is not specially marked over long distances. Donetsk, 100 km as the crow flies, from where the command is said to have been fired at, cannot be reached with such radios, however, because the distance is too great. After the command post of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the DNR was stationed, but apparently in Bezimmene, it can be expected that this point was connected to the corps command in Donetsk with several redundant telecommunications means, for example tropospheric and short-wave radio.
On the basis of the intercepted telephone calls, Bellingcat claims to have identified the artillery units that had been moved across the state border specifically for the purpose of Mariupol shelling: the "200th Detached Motorized Artillery Brigade (military unit 08275)" and the "2nd Detached Guards Taman Motorized Artillery Brigade (military unit 23626) ". [Ix] There are no associations with this name in the Russian army [x]. The unit numbers allow identification: it is the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade [xi] and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division. These associations assumed artillery units, including so-called reactive artillery, which was equipped with "GRAD" type rocket launchers, or was in 2015, but not with "URAGAN" type [xii]. Since Bellingcat is unable to correctly name the allegedly involved artillery units, doubts about the identification of the allegedly involved commanders are not unjustified.
Judgment of the happening
After January 24, the SMM returned to examine the impact craters a second time and published a second spot report with detailed analysis on January 28, 2015.
The bombarded area is a rectangular area with an extension of approx. 1.6 x 1.1 km. The area east of the Kalmius River rises and then flattens again in the Ordzhonikidzevskyi Rayon.
The northern edge of the bombarded area is approximately 400 m from Checkpoint 14 of the Ukrainian armed forces. In spring 2015, along the Taganrowskaya Shosse, there were staggered additional checkpoints, an additional one in Kalinowka, approx. 2.5 km north of checkpoint 14.A few hundred meters east of checkpoint 14, checkpoint 13 is the most advanced facility of the Ukrainian government troops in the East of Mariupol. A prepared defense position of the Ukrainian government troops is located about 2.5 km south of checkpoint 14. The last Ukrainian positions (checkpoints 13 and 14) are a few hundred meters east of the outskirts. At that time, a no man's land at least 10 km wide stretched from there to the positions of the rebels. The westernmost positions of the rebels were on the western edge of Oktiabr (now Verkhnoshyrokivske) and extended south to Shyrokyne and the coast of the Sea of Azov. The SMM's conjecture about the purpose of the bombardment is based on the proximity of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian army at the junction of the Taganrovskaya Shosse.
Map: Checkpoints on the eastern edge of Mariupol
If the purpose of the shelling was to support a terrestrial push by the armed forces of the Donetsk People's Republic along the Taganrowskaya Shosse, a simultaneous shelling of checkpoints 10 and 13 and the defensive positions at Lomakyne and Berdianskoe would have been expected. Bellingcat claims that a larger number of targets in the section east of Mariupol had been targeted with projectile launchers that morning. The SMM, however, only reported one case in the morning and one in the early afternoon.
In addition, Bellingcat was unable to determine the geographic location of the destinations marked with digits. The numbering of targets is not a measure to disguise targets, but rather common artillery practice, which should make target names shorter and more precise. In other words, Bellingcat doesn't know who shot where. This eliminates any basis for making individual officers responsible for the shelling of the Olimpiiskaya wulitsa.
From satellite images it can be seen that checkpoint 14 includes trench systems on both sides of the street and possibly also shelters that extend over an area of approximately 250 mx 100 m. This defensive position is likely to be occupied by an association in tensile strength. Checkpoint 13 was significantly smaller, approx. 50 x 60 m and is probably an advanced position of a motorized rifle group of around 10 men.
Satellite image: Checkpoint 14 (source: google maps)
Tube artillery would have been much more suitable for firing at a small target such as a checkpoint. The distances would have permitted the use of such.
nvestigation of the Special Monitoring Mission SMM
According to the Spot Report from January 24th, 2015, the members of the Mariupol Monitoring Team heard intense thundering in a period of approx. 35 seconds. Rocket launchers produce a specific sound during the launch process, which the experienced observer can easily distinguish from other artillery weapons.
In the bombarded area, 10 buildings received direct hits, one of them, the school building, and two of them. Six buildings burned on a nearby market, probably Kiewskyi Rinok, which does not necessarily mean that all of them were hit directly. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission found a total of 30 craters and analyzed 26 of them. According to the SMM, three craters were created by rockets fired from type BM-27 "URAGAN" and 23 by type BM-21 "GRAD". The missile launcher BM-21 "GRAD" is widely used both by the Ukrainian government troops and by the rebels. The BM-27 "URAGAN", however, is rather rare on both sides.
The "GRAD" rocket launcher fired according to the crater analysis carried out on the same day by the SMM from a northeastern direction, the "URAGAN" from an eastward direction [xiii]. Human Rights Watch also analyzed the craters and came to the conclusion that the missiles had struck from the east. HRW did not provide more precise information.
In its spot report on January 28, 2015, the SMM specified its information from the first spot report [xiv]. By analyzing the craters, the SMM determined the direction of fire of the missiles used. In the case of the crater caused by "GRAD", the SMM shot directions between azimuth 55 ° and 65 °, in the case of "URAGAN" 72 °. The method used here is based on the measurement of residues of explosives and projectiles, as well as bullet channels on site.
Bellingcat also carried out a crater analysis based on photos available on the Internet and aerial photographs of drones [xv]. For some time now, the SMM has not determined the direction of fire based on aerial photographs.
The findings of the SMM on January 28, 2015 regarding the direction of fire completely omitted Oktiabr as a position for the BM-21 rocket launcher, as did Zaichenko for the BM-27.
The methods of crater analysis used by the SMM do not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the shooting distance. The determination of the thrower positions in the SMM Spot Report is based solely on the observation of corresponding systems in the villages of Oktiabr and Zaichenko in the days before the fire. This contradicts Bellingcat's thesis that two Russian reactive artillery batteries had been brought into the room the night before to carry out a fire attack on the eastern part of Mariupol.
In accordance with the applicable procedures for reactive artillery, rocket launchers of the types "GRAD" and "URAGAN" are to be placed at a distance of 6 to 8 km from the line of the collision. Positioning closer to the line of collision unnecessarily exposes these systems to the risk of fire from lighter artillery systems and should therefore be avoided. The assumption that it is a rocket launcher from the village of Oktiabr, on the eastern edge of which are the foremost positions of the armed forces of the Donetsk People's Republic, appears to be less than plausible. The same applies to Zaichenko.
Map sketch: Positions of the conflicting parties and possible positions for reactive artillery (source: author. Map yandex.ru)
BM-21 "GRAD" and BM-27 "URAGAN" rocket launchers
The SMM reported a volley of 35 seconds. A rocket launcher of the type BM-21 "GRAD" can fire a maximum of 40 rockets of caliber 122 mm in a salvo and takes 20 seconds. However, it is also possible to fire fewer than 40 rockets because the individual rockets are fired electrically and the operating team can set this themselves. A missile launcher of the type BM-27 "URAGAN" can fire a maximum of 16 missiles in 8 to 20 seconds [xvi].
Bellingcat provides the wrong time: According to the SMM Spot Report, the shelling occurred at 9:15 am and not at 9:30 am [xvii]. Since Bellingcat claims that Russian artillery batteries were almost continuously firing from 8:00 am that morning, this time difference is relevant [xviii].
The SMM therefore did not find all the craters: if one assumes that the 10 damaged houses were each hit directly by a rocket, the SMM observed 40 impacts, including several unexploded ordnance [xix].
Missile launchers are a means of combating land targets and are therefore used in a battery. A battery of four BM-27 launchers covers a target area of 650 × 650 m with its 64 rockets, a battery of six BM-21 with 240 rockets covers a target area of 450 × 450 m. Only the use of a battery guarantees the desired material effect on unprotected targets. The target area of Checkpoint 14 was significantly smaller.
The duration of 35 seconds during which the SMM heard the impacts means that the volleys of the launchers BM-21 and BM-27 merged into one another. Taking into account the different flight times of the rockets, it can therefore be assumed that both launchers opened their fire practically simultaneously. The practically simultaneous opening of fire by two different rocket launchers six kilometers apart requires coordination, which could only be done by radio or telephone.
The BM-21 and BM-27 missile launchers can fire different types of missiles with different warheads. The most common for both is a warhead with a blasting and splintering effect with impact or instant detonator. The images of the rocket impacts in Mariupol suggest that such projectiles were used. Unfortunately, neither the SMM nor HRW gave more precise information about the type of missile that was used. It would be extremely important to know which ammunition type was used to determine the firing distance, because the different missiles have very different maximum firing ranges. And in order to determine the position of the weapon, in addition to the firing direction, the firing distance is also necessary. Without their knowledge, everything remains only speculation.
The most common types of ammunition in the case of the BM-21 "GRAD" are the 9M22 series with a minimum firing range of 1.6 km and a maximum firing range of 20.4 km. In the case of the BM-27 "URAGAN" it is the 9M37 with a minimum range of 10 km and a maximum range of 35 km.
Firing range
In theory, ballistic projectiles achieve the longest range when fired at an angle of 45 °. In practice, taking air resistance into account, the optimal firing angle is higher, especially with long-range artillery weapons; up to 50 ° [xx].
However, air resistance also means that the impact angle of projectiles is always greater than the launch angle. One of the rockets, struck in Mariupol, of which essential parts protruded from the ground, can be determined to have an impact angle of 45 °, which means that it was fired at an angle of less than 45 ° and was therefore not used at maximum range.
Image: residues of a rocket hit [xxi]
The position spaces at Kozatske and Pervomaiske, which were identified in the study by Bellingcat, are outside the maximum range of "GRAD" rockets [xxii].
Precision of artillery fire
The precision of artillery fire depends on many different factors, such as the technical condition of the weapon and ammunition [xxiii], precision of the work of the operating personnel in all areas, but also on the availability of artillery weather data. The density of the air, its temperature, moisture content and wind direction noticeably influences the trajectory of a projectile. Bellingcat does not comment on this aspect at all.
As far as weather conditions are concerned, the rule of thumb for the BM-21 "GRAD" rocket launcher is that a 1 ° C temperature difference can lead to a deviation of 20 m from the hit position [xxiv]. However, an experienced artilleryman can compensate for the lack of artillery weather data to a certain extent by determining the so-called inconsistency before firing. He does this by pointing an artillery weapon at a point on the ground that can be clearly identified on the map and, after firing one or more shots, measures the deviation between the calculated and the effective hit position. The value obtained in this way can be interpolated linearly to the desired firing range of the impact shooting.
Typical winter weather for the region around Mariupol on the Sea of Azov is night frosts with rising temperatures during the day to around freezing point. The temperature differences on January 24, 2015 were small, the minimum temperature was -3.7 ° C, the maximum temperature -0.8 ° C [xxv]. This small temperature difference does not explain a significant difference in the shooting position, as can be observed in the present case, even when the weather measurement was carried out a long time ago.
Another factor is the precision of the work of the operating personnel, who have to precisely determine the target coordinates and the location of the gun or launcher and then precisely set the direction of fire and the pipe elevation. Experience shows that depending on the shooting distance, even with careful work by the operating personnel, the first shot can take 400 m from the desired target [xxvi]. It is then the task of an observer to order the necessary corrections.
The precision of the elements mentioned also depends to a large extent on the navigation devices and directional aids used: the determination of locations using a map is naturally more precise than with satellite navigation devices such as GPS or GLONASS, the measurement of distances using laser rangefinders than with mechanical-optical measuring devices [xxvii].
If all factors influencing the firing position are known exactly and are known when calculating the shooting elements, artillery weapons are able to fire precise and surprising fires, but at target areas.
Assuming that the UAF checkpoint at the fork in the Taganrovskaya Shosse was the target, the missiles went approximately 1.5 km from the target. Such a large deviation can almost only be explained by gross manual errors by the ground staff. It is not plausible that operating teams working two or several kilometers apart made the same gross mistake at the same time [xxviii].
Map sketch: deviation of the southern group's impact from UAF checkpoint 14
The trajectories of projectiles fired from firearms never run exactly the same way. Deviation of a series of hits from an averaged target point is called scatter. The technical scatter is caused by internal and external ballistic disturbances, such as manufacturing-related tolerances of weapons and ammunition, temperature fluctuations, contamination and wear.
A single launcher "GRAD" scatters its projectiles into an ellipse, the size of which depends on the shooting distance. As a rule of thumb, one can assume that it is twice as long as it is wide in the direction of the shot. In the center of this ellipse, the density of the impacts is highest and decreases towards the outside. At a range of 15 km the length of the ellipse of 400 and a width of 200 m is quite typical for the "GRAD".
The distribution of the impacts in the Ordzhonikidzevskyi rayon of Mariupol fails to identify two groups, one in the south and one in the north, closer to the Taganrovskaya Shosse, which suggests the use of two launchers. The northern ellipse is almost 600 m long and 300 m wide, the southern one measures approximately 400 x 300 m [xxix]. The existence of two such ellipses suggests the use of at least two rocket launchers of the BM-21 "GRAD" type and one of the "URAGAN" type, the launchers possibly being used at different distances. The distribution of the strikes suggests a northern direction of fire rather than an eastern one.
Scattering ellipse and yellow arrows = assumed shot direction (basis: HRW map sketch; the white arrows from the east come from HRW)
There is a certain discrepancy here with crater analysis. If the northern group of impacts is from a "GRAD" rocket launcher, then this suggests a bombardment from 15 km from the north. In this case, the launcher west of Pavlopil would be located in the area under the control of the Ukrainian government forces.
Map sketch: positions of the conflicting parties and positions of the rocket launchers
But the rather small number of strikes and the uncertainties mentioned regarding the type of ammunition, direction determination and others make it seem advisable to refrain from clear blaming. However, it is clear that allegations made after the incident that the projectiles were delivered from the north are not entirely out of thin air.
One can only speculate about the motivation of the shelling: if the armed forces of the "DNR" are actually responsible for the shelling, as Bellingcat claims, then revenge for the shelling of the city of Donetsk with rocket launchers in the days before the 24th January was a motivation. At most, the target was also a missile launcher from the Ukrainian government troops, which the SMM had previously reported from the Ordzhonikidzevskyi Rayon.
Back then, shelling residential areas was a sad reality in the war in eastern Ukraine. In the days after Mariupol was shot at, the city of Donetsk [xxx] and shortly afterwards Luhansk was shot at with cluster ammunition that was banned under international law [xxxi]. This testifies to the lack of consideration of the parties to the conflict - including the Ukrainian government - for the life and security of the residents of the war zone. In connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, those involved have already been convicted of war crimes in similar cases.
Fire in the afternoon
In the afternoon, the SMM again observed rocket launcher fire that apparently hit the UAF checkpoint on the Taganrovskaya Shosse.
"At 13: 02hrs and 13: 21hrs the SMM heard again incoming MLRS salvos lasting for eight seconds, from an easterly direction. At a distance of 300 meters the SMM saw smoke above the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ checkpoint number 14 "[xxxii].
In this context, the description of the return of the two Russian reactive artillery batteries to Russia is also interesting. The instruction was given to hide in forests. Anyone who knows the south of Donetsk Oblast and the coast of the Sea of Azov knows that there are only small acacia groves there, which could camouflage a battery with 4 or 6 launchers, the command center, computing center, supply vehicles and other equipment. Bellingcat's own map shows that there are no large forests in the affected area [xxxiii].
Conclusion:
In summary, it should be noted that the sources of the intercepted telephone conversations - according to the situation of the Ukrainian secret service - were made superficially by Bellingcat.
Bellingcat made serious mistakes in the identification of the units involved, so that the identification of the officers involved should also be treated with caution.
Bellingcat is unable to determine the authorship of the three "URAGAN" missiles, nor to identify the off-site targets identified in the intercepted phone calls. It is clear that on January 24th different targets were fired at from different directions with artillery. Who shot where and where from where remains unclear. This eliminates any basis for making individual officers responsible for the shelling of the Ordzhonikidzevskyi Rayon.
The combination of at least three launchers of different calibers, all of whom fired fewer missiles than they should have fired, from positions in which they should not have been, according to operational procedures, raises doubts about Bellingcat's presentation. The implicit assumption of the SMM that the shelling of the Ordzhonikidzevskyi Rayon is a result of shooting errors by the reactive artillery on the part of Russia or the rebels does not seem plausible.
Bellingcat does not comment on all of these facts, probably not due to a lack of expertise. The so-called investigation can only be described as unprofessional and dubious. The dubious examination of information from a news service on one of the parties involved justifies the term "propaganda".
[i] Such artillery weapons are called English Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), Russian Реактивная Система Залпого Огня. In the German-speaking world, the term artillery missile system or rocket launcher is used. The term projectile launcher was common in the National People's Army. Each 4 or 6 launchers are combined in one battery, depending on the type of launcher.
[ii] Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), January 24, 2015: Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol, January 24, 2015, available at https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/136061 ,
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] An analysis of the SMM daily reports from August 21, 2018 to November 18, 2019 showed that the Ukrainian government troops UAF are responsible for approximately 75% of the cases in which residential areas were bombarded.
[v] Bellingcat Full Report: Russian Officers and Militants Identified as Perpetrators of the January 2015 Mariupol Artillery Strike; https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/05/10/full-report-russian-officers-militants-identified-perpetrators-january-2015-mariupol-artillery-strike/.
[vi] See the regular reports from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/enacaregion/pages/uareports.aspx.
[vii] https://yandex.ru/maps/?l=sat%2Cskl&ll=38.331152%2C47.273891&mode=search&ol=geo&ouri=ymapsbm1%3A%2F%2Fgeo%3Fll%3D38.318172%252C47.276924%26n 3D0.008949% 252C0.005920% 26text 3DUkraine%%% 252C 252C 2520Donetska% 2520oblast%%% 2520Novoazovskyi 2520raion% 252C 2520selo%%% 2520Kuznetsi 2520 & rl = 38.320459% 2C47.277917 ~ -0.235519 0.154668% 2C & z = 15
[viii] ibid.
[ix] https://www.prizyvnik.info/entries/42399-informatsiya_po_;
[x] Annual Military Information of the Russian Federation, January 1, 2015, as part of the exchange of military information within the OSCE.
[xi] See ВОЕННАЯ СЛУЖБА ПО КОНТРАКТУ ВЫБОР; https://monchegorsk.gov-murman.ru/files/vlast/voennaya-sluzhba-/po-kontraktu/200- Чуприн, 2009, Соединения и части окружного подчинения МВО 72.% d1% 8f% 20% d0% be% d1% 82% d0% b4% d0% b5% d0% bb% d1% 8c% d0% bd% d0% b0% d1% 8f% 20% d0% 9f % d0% b5% d1% 87% d0% b5% d0% bd% d0% b3% d1% 81% d0% ba% d0% b0% d1% 8f% 20% d 0% be% d1% 80% d0% b4 % d0% b5% d0% bd% d0% b0% 20% d 0% 9a d1%% 83%% 82% d1 d1 d0% 83%% b7% d0% be% d0% b2% d0% b0.pdf; "GRAD" on p. 15f
[xii] See cases of conquest of rocket launchers BM-21 "GRAD"; In the second half of 2014 alone, the UAF lost 25 rocket launchers, partly through destruction and partly through conquest to the AF of the DNR. https://lostarmour.info/mrlspoils/#statistic.
[xiii] Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), January 24, 2015: Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol, January 24, 2015, available at https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/136061 ,
[xiv] This spot report is no longer available online, but the author has it in paper form.
[xv] Bellingcat, Mariupol Artillery Strike, p. 6.
[xvi] On the technical details of the rocket launchers BM-21 and BM-27: "Manual for artillerymen", training resources of the National People's Army, ed. On behalf of the Ministry for National Defense of the GDR, Berlin 1987, pp. 103 - 117 (projectile launcher RM-70).
[xvii] Bellingcat, Mariupol Artillery Strike, p. 4
[xviii] Bellingcat, Mariupol Artillery Strike, p. 10
[xix] The then deputy chief monitor of the SMM, Alexander Hug, once put the proportion of unexploded ordnance of all types of ammunition in the whole of eastern Ukraine at 30%.
[xx] The reason for this is that in higher layers of air the density of the air is lower and thus the air resistance. For the BM-21 and BM-27 projectile launchers, the maximum tube elevation is 55 °.
[xxi] http://www.nzz.ch/international/europa/die-separatisten-giffen-nach-mariupol-1.18468615.
[xxii] Bellingcat: Russian Officers, satellite image p. 6.
[xxiii] Handbuch für Artilleristen, pp. 269 - 274;
[xxiv] Handbuch für Artilleristen, pp. 295 - 311;
[xxv] https://www.wetter.com/wetter_aktuell/rueckblick/ukraine/mariupol/UA0DT0004.html?sid=34712&timeframe=10y.
[xxvi] See the judgment of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Case No. IT-06-90-A, November 16, 2012, IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER, PROSECUTOR v. ANTE GOTOVINA, MLADEN MARKAČ, p. 20. The precision of 130 mm M-46 cannons and BM-21 rocket launchers played a major role here.
[xxvii] See Handbook for Artillerists, pp. 180 - 197;
[xxviii] With reactive artillery, there is no possibility of a charge error due to the design, in which the operating team chooses an incorrect propellant charge. Such errors can quickly lead to deviations of several hundred meters to kilometers in the firing range. On the other hand, the so-called "hundred promiller" is possible, in which the direction of the shot is set incorrectly by 100 per mille on a scale of 6000 lines. At a range of 15 km, that would explain a deviation of 1.5 km.
[xxix] The fact that the three strikes from URAGAN rocket launchers are not exactly known does not disturb the overall picture. Extreme deviations in the firing range or direction are not taken into account in these ellipses.
[xxx] January 31, 2015. https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/138326.
[xxxi] On February 3, 2015. https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/138906.
[xxxii] Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), January 24, 2015: Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol, January 24, 2015, available at https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/136061 ,
[xxxiii] Bellingcat full report. P. 10, 16.
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